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Abstract
This paper is the ms. of my inaugural lecture at the Aarhus School of Business, 26th
September, 1995, with minor modifications. It traces some of the basic assumptions of
Chomskyan theories of syntax, as they have determined the requirements of a syntactic
description of English sentences containing the verb seem at various points in time. It is
shown that although the purpose of linguistic description must be taken into account
when choosing between competing, descriptively adequate grammars, this will not be
enough unless the goal of linguistic explanation is accessible to independent investiga-
tion. It is argued that a reformulation of the issue between functional explanation or not
in linguistics may overcome the problem.
1. Introduction
There have been two considerations behind my choice of subject for
this lecture. One has been a concern to indicate what ideas I have for the
development of the research profile of the department. The second has
been my wish to acknowledge the achievement of Bent Jacobsen, my
predecessor, and to defer to the research tradition of the department. It
seemed to me that both considerations could be honoured if I sketched
the evolution of Chomskyan linguistics as I see it. The restriction to
Chomskyan linguistics prevents mention of many types of grammar,
some of which have been quite influential and well studied. This goes
for various types of Dependency, Valency  and Categorial grammar, to
a lesser degree for Relational and Arc Pair Grammar, and to a still lesser
degree for Stratificational and Word grammars of various types. It also
precludes mention of the very popular branch of European Functional
Grammar initiated by Simon Dik, the Systemic Functional Grammar
developed by Halliday, and various versions of Case Grammar and
Cognitive Grammar. The omission of all of these should not be taken as
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an indication that I consider them uninteresting or ‘inferior’ in any way.
On the contrary, I think many of them have revealed facts about lan-
guage that Chomskyan linguistics could not originally handle and
therefore simply ignored until it was revised to absorb their results. One
of my  hopes is  to inspire research in all or some of these, in this way
perhaps to broaden the theoretical outlook of the department.
Even with the restriction to Chomskyan linguistics, the task I am
setting myself would still be an awesome one in just an hour if I had to
do it in general terms.  Yet it so happens that there is one verb which has
played a recurrent and persistent role in this development right from the
start. In fact, and putting it rather crudely, the development of
Chomskyan linguistics may be seen as the history of the changing
views about what it takes to describe English sentences containing the
verb seem.
So this is part of what I’ll do. I ’ll trace the theoretical and analytical
requirements thought necessary for writing a grammar of seem within
Chomsky’s paradigm and one or two theories that have branched off
from it, and I’ll pay special attention to the assumptions of linguistic
analysis at various times in the evolution. Number [1] in the handout is
a statement of what appears to be the most basic assumption of
linguistics and grammar of any kind at any time:
[1] It is the goal of linguistics to provide a description of the syste-
matic properties of all languages which is rational, general, con-
sistent, and as simple as possible.
This has been known as the requirement of descriptive adequacy since
Chomsky’s Current Issues in Linguistics (1964). It is taken over from
the natural sciences, and it is therefore sometimes taken to imply that
there is one and only one true description of a language. But it doesn’t.
For even though as eminent a scientist as Niels Bohr repeatedly stressed
that it is impossible to give an impartial description of nature (‘the very
act of observation influences the object observed’), it has nevertheless
been a view with some chance of apparent success in the sciences for
the simple reason that nature is not there for a purpose. To illustrate,
when Rutherford - the nuclear physicist - was once asked by the woman
sitting next to him at a dinner party what use nuclear physics might
possibly be, he replied testily: ‘Ma’am, what use are babies?’
In contrast, language certainly seems to be here for a purpose - in fact
for many different purposes. It has arisen, not just to fill a gap in nature,
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but to fulfill a need. The prevailing view at the moment is that the prime
purpose of language is to convey information, and this may well be so.
But the point is not which purpose language is supposed to serve. The
general point is usually taken to be this: Whichever purpose language is
supposed to serve, must that purpose be borne in mind when you formu-
late a descriptive theory for it? John Searle, the eminent philosopher of
language, says ‘yes’, Chomsky, the no less eminent linguist, says ‘no’. 
As the point is formulated, I must agree with Chomsky. But I think
the formulation is spurious. As I see it, the point should be formulated
like this: What is the purpose of your description of language? In other
words, what is it you are trying to tell me about language by describing
it the way you do? You may describe the heart as a large muscle of a
unique structure with a varying number of cavities, depending on what
kind of heart it is. Or you may describe it as a pump. Or you may
describe it as the seat of love. Which description is true? I suppose they
all are - but in different contexts. They may all tell you something useful
about the heart. 
Someone might object that only the heart-as-muscle description is
‘true’, for it is the only scientific description of it. The heart-as-pump-
description is a functional one, and the heart-as- loveseat is just roman-
tic dribble. But here, I’m afraid, you’ll run into difficulties. What you
are advocating is description for description’s sake. And that is not very
interesting. What is worse, it is also circular.
To continue the heart story, the biology student who was satisfied
with a description, down to the minutest fibre, of the structure of the
heart-as-muscle, would no doubt flunk his exam if he had failed to re-
alize that there is a correlation between structure-of-muscle and
function-as-pump. But now an interesting picture emerges. It turns out
that our fictitious student might claim either that the function-as-pump
explains the peculiarity of the structure-of-muscle, or that the peculiar-
ity of the structure-of-muscle explains the heart’s potential as a pump.
Now, if he was Searle’s student, he would get a good mark for claiming
the former, whereas Chomsky would probably fail him. And vice versa. 
After this reformulation of the point of debate between functionalism
or not, I believe that Chomsky and Searle are both partly right, both
partly wrong. Chomsky is right and Searle wrong to the extent that a
structural solution to a particular functional problem need not be the
only logically possible one - after all, the functional problem of loco-
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motion has been solved structurally by the evolution of legs, wings, and
fins, depending on context. Chomsky is wrong and Searle right to the
extent that it is precisely the peculiarity of the structure-as-muscle that
is in need of explanation - why should the fibre structure of the heart be
different from that of other muscles?
However this issue might be settled, the point remains that a scien-
tific description of a phenomenon is only interesting if it tries to explain
something about that phenomenon. And that is what Chomskyan
linguistics tries to do. What I’ll try to do in this connection is to discuss
to what extent the proposed descriptions explain what they set out to do.
With these points in mind, let me now comment on a few presup-
positions of the requirement of descriptive adequacy.
[2a] it presupposes the existence of a language, or notation, in terms
of which the description can be stated
[2b] it presupposes some degree of consensus about what linguisti-
cally relevant facts and data are
[2c] it presupposes the existence of some kind of principle by which
we may compare, and choose between, two distinct, but des-
criptively adequate, grammars
To illustrate [2a]: there is a world of difference between traditional
grammatical terminology - as used by Jespersen, for example - and the
terminology used by Government and Binding Theory. And there is a
world of difference between the notational devices used by Lexical
Functional Grammar and that used by the Standard Theory of Genera-
tive Grammar. Nevertheless, we presume, everyone is concerned to
give what they consider a true desription of the data.
To illustrate [2b]: there is a world of difference as to whether you
allow ungrammatical sentences as evidence for conclusions - and hence
as linguistic facts - or not. Strictly speaking, only positive evidence can
be relevant to description. If you admit negative evidence it is because
your motives go beyond description proper. This is why I shall admit
negative evidence.
Finally, what [2c] says is that there may in fact be two competing
grammars that describe the same relevant linguistic data. Therefore,
there must be some way to choose between them. Chomsky has always
appealed to the notion of explanatory adequacy to handle this point.
What this means, in essence, is that linguistic theory should help us
180
decide between competing, descriptively adequate grammars, and at
the same time explain something about language. Now, there may be all
sorts of questions about language that we might want linguistic theory
to explain. But to Chomsky, what needs explaining is the true nature of
our language faculty, and how we get it. If no consensus is reached on
this point, or if cognitive faculties are considered out of bounds to the
goals of linguistics, then some other goal for linguistic theory must be
stated. And here, for reasons already indicated, it is not enough just to
appeal to descriptive fidelity to the linguistic ‘facts’ - which would be
circular.
2. The data
Let me now present a list of data that a grammar of seem must take into
account. Notice that I accept both positive and negative data, for the
reason already given.
[3] A: Raising and Complementizer Type
1. John seems a nice chap
2. John seems to be a nice chap
3. It seems (that) John is a nice a chap
4. *It seems for John to be a nice chap
5. *For John to be a nice chap seems
B: Complementation
1. John seems (to be) a nice chap
2. John seems (to be) interesting
3. John seems to laugh
4. *John seems laughing
5. John seems to be laughing
6. John seems (to be) in trouble
7. John seems (to be) far away
C: Definiteness Restriction
1. *John seems (to be) the nice chap
2. It seems that John is the nice chap
3. *John seems like the nice chap
D: Extraposition and Expletion
1. It seems (that) there is a discrepancy here
2. There seems to be a discrepancy here
3. *There seems there is a discrepancy here
4. *There seems a discrepancy here
5. *It seems (to be) a discrepancy here
6. *A discrepancy seems (to be) here
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7. It seems (that) John is a nice chap
8. *There seems that John is a nice chap
9. *There seems John to be a nice chap
10. *There seems John a nice chap
11. John seems (to be) a nice chap
12. *John seems that there is a discrepancy here
E: Tacit arguments
1. It seems (to me) that John is a nice chap
2. ?It seems to Harry that John is a nice chap
F: Comparison
1. John seems like a nice chap
2. *John seems like nice
3. *John seems like to laugh/laughing
4. *John seems like in trouble
5. *John seems like far away
I have indicated the grammatical phenomenon that these blocks of
examples are supposed to exemplify in the headlines. Thus the A-
examples illustrate phenomena usually subsumed under the term
Raising, the technical term for the view that a structural element has
been ‘raised’ by some grammatical process from its ‘original’ position
in a complement clause to a position in the matrix clause. The question
of  complementizer type is associated with this. Group B concerns the
categorial type of phrasal complement; Group C illustrates some
restrictions on the referential form of noun phrases in the complement
of seem; Group D illustrates the two different kinds of expletive element
it and there in seem clauses; the small Group E suggests that seem from
a semantic point of view selects a non-thematic Experiencer role, which
is obligatory in the sense that it will always refer to the (direct or
indirect) speaker: sentence [E2] must be understood as a report of
Harry’s utterance of sentence [E1]; and finally Group F displays the
fact that seem may select the comparative preposition like, which only
takes NP complements. Perhaps this case is covered already by block
[B5].
This, I believe, is an exhaustive list of the grammatically relevant
‘facts’ about the occurrence of seem in the main stream linguistics
literature. An informal, but descriptively adequate, account of the
syntactic potential of seem might be:
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[4] Discriptively adequate ‘grammar’ for the language frag-
ment [3]:
• it takes NP [3A1] or expletive it/there [3D1, 3D2] as sub-
ject
• it takes a single complement, which may be either a that-
clause [3D1], an infinitival VP [3B3], a NP [3B1], an AP
[3B2], a PP [3B6], or an AVP [3B7]
• if the subject is a NP, the complement cannot be a that-
clause [3D12]
• if the subject is expletive there, the complement must be
an infinitival VP [3D2-4, 8-10]
• if the subject is expletive it, the complement must be a
that-clause [3D1,5]
• if the complement is a NP, it must be indefinite [3C]
• it selects an Experiencer role which - if expressed - must
be in the form of a prepositional phrase headed by to; it
will always refer to the speaker, directly or indirectly [3E]
Now, if this was all there was to it, we might just stop here and all go
home. Indeed, to some people it is all there is to it - namely to those who
believe that descriptive linguistics is just a matter of collecting a large
enough body of data and then sit down and describe what you see, like
butterflies. But consider what might happen if a diligent Danish
student, who had learnt this grammar by heart, sat down and followed
it slavishly when translating from Danish. We might find ‘sentences’
like those in [3’]:
[3’] B6. *John seems about her (= John synes om hende)
B7. *She seems beautifully (= Hun ser skøn ud)
D2. *There seems to sit a man  (= Der synes at sidde en mand)
None of these would be excluded as ungrammatical - but they are! The
problem with the grammar is that it does not try to generalize.
3. Generality
There are two mutually conflicting concerns in descriptive linguistics.
On the one hand, in the interest of generality we should concentrate on
properties of sentences which can be subsumed under general
principles. Relative to the data in [3], this would make us look for
principles to account for the fact that, say, [3A1-3] always have the
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same truthvalue. On the other hand, individual lexical items have
idiosyncratic properties which would seem to require a non-general,
particular description for each lexical item on its own. Linguistic
analysis to a large extent is a matter of balancing these two concerns
against one another, and always remember there is a trade-off between
them.
In traditional descriptive grammar, the emphasis was on the second
of these concerns to such an extent that classification of lexical items in
terms of their grammatical potential was seen as the main goal of
syntactic analysis. To illustrate, the only use that a modern traditional
grammar makes of the syntactic properties of seem is to establish its
classification. 
In section 3.8 of Quirk et al. (1982), seem to is classified as a semi-
auxiliary along with:






There is another subclass of semi-auxiliaries:














They are all semi-auxiliaries because they are like lexical verbs in not
admitting inversion and negation without do. They are nevertheless
auxiliaries because they take a naked infinitive and admit passive of it
while not allowing passive themselves. The distinction between the two
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types of semi-auxiliaries is also based on syntactic critera. While verbs
of type [5a] admit cleft constructions, verbs of type [5b] do not; cf. [5c]:
[5c] a. he seemed to like it ←→ it seemed that he liked it
b. he tended to like it ←→ *it tended that he liked it
In section 12.32 of the same work, seem is classified as a socalled
‘current’ copula1 - as opposed to the ‘resultant’ copulas2 - and both are
considered to have more ‘intrinsic’ meaning than the ‘colourless’
copula be. Since copulas in general are considered to form an
‘intensive’ relation, we may infer that seem is an intensive verb - that is,
that it takes a subject predicate complement. And since predicative
nominals respect the Definiteness Restriction, [3C1] is ungrammatical.
In contrast, [3C2] contains identitive ‘be’ - establishing an identity
relation between the referents of John and the nice chap.
Classification as the primary goal of linguistics was rejected by
Generative Grammar, though it was still important to establish syn-
tactically motivated subcategories. Instead, significant generalization
became the all-important catchphrase. Missing a significant generaliza-
tion soon became the deadliest sin of a grammar, and transformational
rules became the tool for capturing them. Lexical idiosyncracies still
had to be taken into account, of course, but they were dismissed as
uninteresting. It was ‘just’ a matter of listing them in the lexicon on a
form appropriate for the lexical insertion rules to handle. An early
lexical entry for seem looked like [6]:
[6] Lexical entry for seem (Chomsky 1965:94)
seem, [+V, + __Adjective, + __like_Predicate-Nominal]
This entry states that seem is a verb [+V], and that it subcategorizes for
- that is, takes as complements - either an Adjective or the word like
followed by a nominal with predicative function. Thus it accounts
immediately for examples [3B2] and all of [3F], but fails to account for
any of the others in [3]. Why? Because the derivation of each of these
is seen as a general matter of syntax, not a specific matter of lexical
properties. The prime target for generalization were Raising and
Expletives, and the price was an enormous battery of transformational
rules, as you will see from the cartoon in [7a-e], which tells the
derivational story of sentences [3A]:
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1 Along with appear, feel, lie, look, remain, rest, smell, sound, stand, taste.
2 Become, come, get, go, grow, fall, run, turn.
[7a] Deep structure, produced by Phrase Structure Rules and Lexical
Rules




it S2 Tns V
that NP AUX VP Pres seem
Pro Tns V NP







Pro Tns V NP
He Pres be  a nice chap
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[7c] The tree resulting from application of Extraposition (T-rule) to
[7b]
[7d] The tree resulting from selection of for to as Complementizer,




He Pres seem for AUX VP
to V NP
be a nice chap
S1
NP AUX VP S2
it Tns V
that NP AUX VP
Pres seem
Pro Tns V NP
He Pres be a nice chap
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[7e] The tree resulting from application of obligatory Complementizer
Deletion (T- rule) to [7d]
I’ll not go into detail over this, but only pinpoint a few salient features.
Figure [7a] is a representation of what was called Deep Structure,
created by socalled Phrase Structure Rules and Lexical Rules. The rest
of the Figures are derived step by step from the previous one by a
socalled Transformational Rule. So Transformational Rules, which
contain very precise instructions, rearrange already existing structure
by adding or deleting material, or by moving bits of structure from one
place to another. This reflects one of the very few points of Chomsky’s
views of technical detail that has remained stable through time: his
obsession with geometric arrangement. Indeed, the shaping principle
for every version of the Standard Theory up until now has been the
principle that things move in a structure - which therefore must be
assumed to have fixed geometric properties in advance.
Now, this may seem farfetched, and highly abstract. But there is no
denying that we here have the machinery that will be able to explain our
intuition that [3A3] in some sense is ‘the same sentence’ as [3A2],
which in its turn is ‘felt’ to be ‘the same sentence’ as [3A1]. The
difference between [3A2] and [3A3] can be precisely located as a
difference in the (random) selection of complementizer. If we select for




He Pres seem AUX VP
to V NP
be a nice chap
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was with that. When it is brought to work - on a structure like [7b],
except that it has for instead of that as complementizer - we get the
result in [7d]. The complementizer for demands Complementizer
Deletion, which will yield the derived structure [7e]. After the applica-
tion of still further transformational rules not illustrated, we get the final
derived tree underlying [3A2]. In order to get [3A1], we just have to
apply a transformation - very controversial even at the time - of Copula
Deletion to [7e]. But as you can see, there is certainly generality in all
of this. It will account for the grammaticality judgements in the data
sets [3A] to [F], except [C], which are handled by other general rules,
and [E], which is simply ignored. But it has a price.
4. The Lexicalist Controversy
That price, as already mentioned, was the enormous descriptive power
of transformations. This is the key issue in what is now known as the
Lexicalist controversy between the Generative Semanticists, or
‘Generativists’ as they have come to be called,  on the one hand and the
Interpretive Semanticists with Chomsky as general on the other. Since
the crucial point of disagreement concerned the role of semantics in a
grammar, the controversy had farreaching consequences for linguistic
theory. And since Chomsky had introduced, and still accepted, the
central role of transformational rules, he had in fact given his opponents
a powerful tool for writing grammars that described the facts correctly.
For there is no doubt that a grammar with transformational rules will be
descriptively adequate, as we have just seen. But then again, there is no
guarantee that there is any other motivation for a given T-rule than
precisely this: that it does describe the facts correctly. And since a lot of
different rules might do that, there is no guarantee that this kind of
grammar explains anything about our mental linguistic faculty, as it was
supposed to do.
But let me be a bit more concrete. Relative to our project, the
Lexicalist Controversy didn’t concern the analysis of seem directly. It
concerned the question of how sentences with other types of verb
should be analysed, given the analysis of seem.
The basic underlying structure of sentences with seem, according to
[7],  was held to be [8a]:
[8a] [[S he AUX be a nice guy] [seem]]
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- which has a sentential subject. But suppose instead it was taken to be
[8b]:
[8b] [[seem][S he AUX be a nice guy]]
- that is a structure with a sentential complement. This might bring
sentences with  seem into allignment with a lot of other sentences, for
there are many verbs that take sentential complements. The question
was, could there be given a description that would cover all these cases?
[9] shows some relevant data:
[9] a1. She persuaded him to become a spy
a2. *She persuaded to become a spy
a3. *She persuaded that he became a spy
b1. *She assumed him to be a spy
b2. *She assumed to be a spy
b3. She assumed that he was a spy
c1. She expected him to be a spy
c2. She expected to be a spy
c3. She expected that he was a spy
d1. She believed him to be a spy
d2. *She believed to be a spy
d3. She believed that he was a spy
In each case we have a sentential complement. But was it the same kind
of complement structure in all of [9]?
Chomsky said no. In addition, he assumed that two transformational
rules, Raising and Equi-NP- Deletion, were necessary to cope with [9].
The syntactic differences were attributed to different deep structure
properties, plus the sensitivity of individual verbs to reflexivization.
Thus we get deep structures for the a-c examples like [10] (details
omitted):
[10] a. she persuaded [NP himi] [S hei become a spy]
b. she assumed [S he be a spy]
c. she expected [NP it [S he be a spy]]
But what about [9d]? If we derive it from a structure like [10a], we get
in trouble over the different grammaticality status of the examples
marked 3 in [9]. If we derive it from a structure like [10b], we get in
trouble over the different grammaticality status of the examples marked
1 in [9]. This leaves structure [10c]. The difference between the
examples marked 2 in [9], then, is to be accounted for by claiming that
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believe requires reflexivization of a coreferential complement subject
NP, while expect requires Equi-NP-Deletion.
In a spirited attack on the Extended Standard Theory, Paul Postal
(1974) devoted a book of about 450 pages to the discussion of just one
T-rule and its theoretical ramifications - the rule now known as Raising.
Only this rule is required to account for the data in [8] and [9], he
claims, and only one highly abstract kind of deep structure need be
postulated, instead of the three already given in [10]. But only if we are
prepared to give up such dogma as SVO order in deep structure and to
introduce a number of abstract layers of lexical transformations. On
these assumptions [9a1], for example, has the deep, or semantic,
structure in [11].
[11] CAUSE she [AGREE he [BECOME he a spy]] → she persua-
ded him to become a spy
The problem for linguistic theory that is highlighted by this controversy
is that one cannot argue against either of these views from its failure to
describe the facts correctly. In fact the Generativists gave some very
persuasive and general, but highly abstract descriptions of a wide range
of linguistic phenomena, and Postal, I believe, was the first linguist to
realize that seem must have the obligatory Experiencer Role referred to
in [3E].
Therefore, to argue against the Generativists, Chomsky could not
argue from their failure to describe what they saw as the ‘relevant’
linguistic facts, but had to use other types of argument, concerning
falsifiability, simplicity, generality and rationality. The trouble with this
is that there was, and is, no generally accepted principle by which he
could choose his own model rather than that of the Generativists -
except his own notion of explanatory adequacy. And there neither was,
nor is, a generally accepted view of what our language faculty might
look like, and which might therefore provide him with a sound basis to
his argument. This leads us to the next stage in the evolution.
5. Strong Lexicalism
The position defended by Chomsky against the Generativists was
known as ‘lexicalism’. Its defining characteristic was the insistence that
matters of lexical derivation were best regarded as properties of the
lexicon and of individual lexical items, rather than of the syntactic
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component of the grammar. This position, which is now known as
‘weak lexicalism’, soon came under attack from the opposite side by
people who wanted to include not only derivational morphology, but
also inflectional morphology in the lexicon, in particular the
morphology of passive, up till now the syntactic process par excellence.
The leading figures among these ‘strong lexicalists’ were Joan Bresnan
and Ron Kaplan, who developed an influential branch of linguistics
known as Lexical Functional Grammar. I’ll call it LFG. The name
reflects the major points of departure from the Standard Theory, except
one: LFG does not permit transformational rules. Instead, much more
descriptive potential was invested in lexical entries and lexical rules.
Also the grammatical functions (Subject, Object, etc.) were given
primitive status, rather than being defined by configuration, as in the
Standard Theory. And this is the point of relevance to us here.
The lexical entry for seem in LFG looks like this (irrelevant details
omitted) is [12]:
[12] seem V (↑ PRED = ‘seem < (↑ XCOMP) > ↑ SUBJ)’
(↑ SUBJ) = (↑ XCOMP SUBJ)
Since this is not meant as an introduction to LFG, I’ll just explain what
this means in as plain terms as possible: seem can be inserted in a
constituent structure under the node V, provided the same structure has
an open complement node (XCOMP) and a Subject node. Of these,
only the XCOMP node is an argument (indicated in [12] by pointed
brackets), whereas the Subject node is non-thematic. The second line in
the entry stipulates that the Subject of seem is the same as the Subject
of the Complement.
The idea that lexical items subcategorize for grammatical functions
like subject and object, rather than categories (like NP and PP), adds
enormously to the descriptive potential of a simple phrase-structure
grammar, because different functions may be performed by categories
of different types. This potential is exploited in LFG by its recognition
of two distinct types of structure, a constituency structure and a
functional structure. The constituency structure deals with the phrase
types that realize the particular grammatical functions. It also deals
with constituency order, whereas functional structure deals with
abstract grammatical relationships. Therefore, constituency structure is
language-specific, wheras functional structure is universal, or at least
cross-linguistic. An English and a Latin sentence, say, may have the
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same functional structure, but differ in constituency structure (and
lexicon, of course). To mention just one example of the added
descriptive power of LFG over the Standard Theory, consider [13]:
[13] a. In this cave dwells a large, ferocious beast
b. In this cave seems to dwell a large, ferocious beast
If subjects are defined as NP’s, as they are in the Standard Theory, and
if Raising is a rule that concerns NP’s in subject position, then the
Standard Theory may have difficulties with a general account of the
relationship between [13a] and [b]. If on the other hand there is no
Raising transformation, but only a functional specification to the effect
that whatever is Subject of seems is also Subject of to dwell, there is no
problem. And this is quite independent of the potentially controversial
question whether the Subject in [13] is In this cave (as LFG will have it)
or not.
This leads to the fate of the Raising transformation in LFG. Since
there are no transformations, something else is required to handle the
relationship between ‘understood’ subjects and non-finite complement
structures. This is done in the theory of Functional Control. I said
before that XCOMP was an open complement. This means, in effect,
that it is a complement which needs something from ‘outside’, as it
were, to be complete. This ‘something’ is a subject. Consider [9a1] and
[9a2] again, repeated as [14a], and compare it to [14b]:
[14] a1. She persuaded him to become a spy
a2. *She persuaded to become a spy
b1. She promised him to become a spy
b2. She promised to become a spy
In each case, to become a spy is an XCOMP. In LFG jargon, it is
functionally controlled, in the a-examples by the Object of persuaded,
in the b-examples by the Subject of promised. This is a fancy way of
saying that the logical subject of to become is him in a, but she in b. The
difference emerges from the lexical entries for the two verbs, printed in
bold type in [15]:
[15] a. persuade V (↑ PRED) = ‘persuade <(↑ SUBJ) (↑ OBJ) (↑ XCOMP)>’ 
(↑ XCOMP SUBJ) = (↑ OBJ)
b. promise V (↑ PRED) = ‘promise <(↑ SUBJ) (↑ OBJ) (↑ XCOMP)>’ 
(↑ XCOMP SUBJ) = (↑ SUBJ)
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The difference between [14a2] and [14b2] is now explained on the basis
of a lexical rule that drops the Object and therefore associates the
argument with no phonetic realization. Since only material Subjects
and Objects are assumed to be controllers, but not empty arguments,
this rule has removed the controller from [14a2], leaving the resulting
functional structure incoherent.
Once again, we have a grammar which is descriptively correct, on
some points even more so than the Standard Theory. What would be the
arguments for choosing LFG over another grammar type? Well,
according to the founding mother, LFG is meant as a psychologically
more revealing theory than the Standard Theory. This is an interesting
motivation, for it reflects the basis of Chomsky’s version of explanatory
adequacy, that linguistic theory should explain the cognitive capacity
behind linguistic behaviour. But it still doesn’t work, for we still need
an independently motivated account of cognitive capacity, just as we
did in Chomsky’s case. All we can say now is that there are two
linguistic theories that each purports to explain a cognitive capacity
which we don’t know much else about, but which both give rise to
grammars that describe the facts correctly.
But there is another argument. Ron Kaplan’s main contribution to the
development of LFG was to make sure that it became a computational
theory of language description, and he in fact wrote a very succesful
LFG parser. A parser is a computer program that will take natural lan-
guage sentences as input and output the appropriate structures that
describe them in LFG terms. Now, you may agree or disagree that writ-
ing a computer program that will parse natural language sentences is
the purpose of linguistic theory. But you cannot deny the transparency
of a theory that allows you to do this. In contrast, the Standard Theory
was opaque in this respect; far too much information was lost in the
maze of transformations for anyone to write but the simplest parsers for
these grammars. So, to the extent that the socalled Computational
Theory of Mind is a good model of cognitive capacity, LFG is a ‘better’
theory than the Standard Theory. 
The strong lexicalist view of LFG has been carried over in such
influential new directions as Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar
(Gazdar et al. 1985) and Head Driven Phrase Structure Grammar
(Pollard & Sag, 1992; 1995), probably the most serious rivals of the
Standard Theories to date. What is more, LFG is also certain to have
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influenced Chomsky in his revision of the Extended Standard Theory
which ultimately led to the development of Government & Binding.
6. Trace Theory
I left Chomsky dangling between the Standard Theory and what is now
known as  the Extended Standard Theory, the next major development
within Chomsky’s family of grammars, which saw the introduction of
Trace theory in Reflections on Language from 1976.
The implications of this move for syntactic theory were farreaching.
To mention just two, it codified the notion of empty category - that is,
syntactically significant elements without material realization in phon-
etic form, and it solved the problem of ‘lost’ and irretrievable informa-
tion that had marred the Standard account. In our context it meant that
the D-structure of [3A2] now looks like [16a]:
[3A2] John seems to be a nice chap
[16] a. Y seems [S he AUX be a nice chap]
Chomsky explicitly attributes this analysis to Bresnan, the mother of
LFG. A T-rule that he calls ‘NP-preposing’  maps [16a] onto [16b]:
[16] b. he seems [S e AUX be a nice chap]
Here e is the trace left behind by, and bound by, he, which is moved up
front by NP-preposing. Chomsky finds support for Trace theory in
general, and for the socalled ‘Specified Subject Condition’ associated
with it in particular, from a discussion of examples like [17]:
[17] a. *it seems to us that Bill likes each other
b. *Tom seems to us to like each other
c. it seems to each of us that Bill likes the other(s)
d. Tom seems to each of us to like the other(s)
First of all, he claims, there is no semantic reason why the ideas ex-
pressed by the grammatical examples c and d should not be expressible
by a and b; and in particular, why the b sentence should be ungram-
matical. There is no material subject in the complement sentence to like
each other, and the ‘nearest’ NP is us, otherwise a perfectly gram-
matical antecedent for each other, as shown in  
[18] they told us to love each other
The reason, he claims, is that although we cannot see it or hear it, there
must nevertheless be a subject - and the only candidate is the trace left
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after moving Tom up front. So Tom - or more precisely,  its trace - is the
Specified Subject, which blocks the association between us and each
other. Since no one has ever explicitly taught us this, and since the
relevant negative evidence is never forthcoming for us to react to
among the sentences we hear, he concludes that both Trace theory and
the Specified Subject Condition are empirically and independently
sustained aspects of Universal Grammar.
And this is the true subject of Government and Binding, or Prin-
ciples and Parameters Grammar, as it has now come to be called. I
shall call it GB.
7. GB
Two interdependent features distinguish the development of GB from
its predecessors. Firstly, where earlier versions of the Standard Theory
had relied heavily on the notion of rule of grammar, divided into Phrase
Structure Rules and Transformational Rules, GB rejects it, relying
instead on the notion of principle of grammar - or rather, principles that
every grammar of every human language must satisfy. In fact, there is
only one ‘rule’ left - the last gasp of the previously all-powerful Trans-
formational component, called Move-α. The production of a deep
structure, previously the job of the Phrase Structure rules, is now
guided by the principles of the socalled X-bar theory.
Secondly, and related to the first point, previous grammars had been
organized into components by the two types of rule, the Base, or Phrase
Structure Component, and the Transformational Component. Now, the
grammar is organized into many more interdependent and cooperative
components, each of which represents a particular aspect of syntactic
structure. Each component can in fact be seen as a delimited theory of
a particular aspect of syntactic structure. In addition to X-bar Theory
already mentioned, they are: Trace Theory, which deals with the prin-
ciples of movement of constituents, Case theory, which deals with the
principles for the assignment of syntactic functions to constituents, X-
bar-theory, which deals with the principles for assigning semantic
functions to arguments, and The Theory of Binding and Control, which
deals with the principles for syntactic interpretation of empty categories
and anaphoric reference. However, since many of these principles are
mutually dependent, the operations of the various components are not
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sequentially ordered, but simultaneous. Then all or some of the prin-
ciples of each component will act as a kind of filter, allowing some
strings as grammatical, disallowing others.
Let us see how all this influences the description of sentences with
seem.
The lexical entry for seem in GB is [19]
[19] seem, V, <S’ ⇒ S>, (Proposition), assigns no case
It says that seem is a verb that subcategorizes for a complement S’
prime, which may be ‘replaced’ by (simple) S, that it s-selects a single,
internal argument that must be a Proposition, and that it does not assign
Case to its complement. A radical change from earlier versions of the
Standard Theory is that the important subcategorization criterion is
now what is called s (for semantic) - selection of arguments, in this case
the selection of Proposition.
By X-bar principles, we get a d-structure like [20a] for [3A2-3]:
[20] a. [NP ] INFL seem [S’ COMP [S John INFL [VP be a nice 
chap]]]
Here we have an empty ‘landing site’ for NP (the subject, which must
be filled in English). INFL is the new label for what used to be called
AUX, and COMP (for COMPLEMENTIZER) is the sister of S under
the maximal projection S’.
Now, since the subject NP node must be filled, we have two
possibilities, depending on the contents of COMP. If it is that, nothing
happens except that the upper INFL comes to assign nominative case to
an empty NP - which it cannot. Therefore, the expletive it is enforced,
as the carrier of case. This will give us the s-structure [20b]:
b. it seems [S’ that [S John is a nice chap]]
- which corresponds to the structure of sentence [3A3].
If on the other hand COMP is occupied by for, we get the ‘pruning’
of S’ to S, suggested in [19], which opens another possibility. Seem is
an intransitive verb - and intransitive verbs are assumed not to assign
case. However, according to the socalled Case Filter, every phonetically
realized NP must be assigned case. John in [20a] is phonetically
realized, so it must receive case. It cannot get it from seem, and it
cannot get it from the subordinate INFL, for reasons I won’t go into.
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Therefore, it must move, to a position where it can be assigned case - an
instance of Move-α - so we get an s-structure like [20c]:
c. Johni seems [S ei to be a nice chap]
- corresponding to [3A2].
I have omitted a lot of detail, but even without that I’m sure you find
this fairly tough going. The drive towards Universal Grammar is a drive
towards explanatory adequacy at the expense of descriptive perspicuity.
Yet the explanatory value of GB is no greater than it was for the rule-
based model. Of course it is less of a commitment to a special mental
architecture to say that it is described in terms of a set of general
principles than it would be to say that it is described by a set of specific
rules. But this does not alter the fact that we still need independent
evidence for it. 
GB is also a drive towards a much higher degree of abstraction, at
least as high as that of the Generativists, which was discarded by
Chomsky as ‘too abstract’! I suppose this is why it only represents the
last step but one in the evolutionary history of the Standard Theory.  For
the last step - the socalled Minimalist Program, which is currently being
developed - is precisely an attempt to minimize abstractness in favour
of ‘naturalness’. Let us look very briefly at some of the main points of
the Minimalist Program.
8. The Minimalist Program
The idea that our language faculty is a computational system was
explicitly introduced in Chomsky’s last largescale contribution to GB,
Knowledge of Language, from 1986; but it is only with the Minimalist
Program that the consequences of this idea have come to be seen as
general constraints on the directions in which principles of language
structure might be looked for and formulated. The main concern of the
Minimalist Program, which began to take form in 1992, and which is
further developed in Chomsky (1995) is to reduce the machinery
established in Government and Binding. The guide for this reduction
should be considerations of what it might take to compute a sentence
from a random choice of lexical items, given a number of assumptions
of ‘naturalness’ like ‘Least Effort’, ‘Greed’, and ‘Procrastinate’. These
principles are all explained in relation to computation. Thus,  maximal
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exploitation of the principle of ‘Least Effort’ is to compute nothing,
which would just leave the lexical choices in some random order.
Therefore some effort is required, and the job is to determine how
much, and how it is applied. However, since reduction of descriptive
complexity does not in itself entail reorientation of descriptive practice,
the Minimalist Program will bring us no closer to an understanding of
our linguistic capacity than its predecessors.
But it does bring us back to the beginning. Chomsky explicitly wants
the Minimalist Programme to determine how ‘perfect’ language is.
Now, this is a totally new concept in Chomskyan linguistics. In fact, it
only makes sense to ask for degrees of perfection of anything in relation
to some preestablished norm. The preestablished norm, as we might
expect in this case, is our current understanding of general cognitive
processes, and if  it turns out that our language faculty is wholly
explainable in terms of these, it is a ‘perfect’ system. As I have tried to
stress throughout, we are still a long way away from knowing enough
about such processes to conclude one way or the other. But the very fact
that Chomsky now seems prepared to entertain the possibility that our
language faculty is not ‘perfect’ in this sense, suggests that there may
be other factors involved. And although he doesn’t actually say so,
these factors may very well be functional, and we are back with the
original debate between Chomsky and Searle, so it may be time to close
down the system.
9. Conclusion
It has been my concern in this lecture, partly to trace a line of lingusitic
development, partly to point out how various grammars might seek to
describe the same set of linguistic facts. It turned out that all of them
could be brought to describe the facts ‘correctly’, even though the
assumptions behind them differed significantly. It has therefore been
posed as a requirement on lingustics to come up with a principled way
to determine which is the ‘better’ grammar, and it has been shown that
Chomsky’s principle of explanatory adequacy will not do the trick,
essentially because we lack independent knowledge of the capacities he
seeks to explain. So I agree with Gerald Gazdar - one of the founders of
GPSG and one of the most informed and coherent critics of Chomsky’s
- when he says: 
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If linguistics is truly a branch of psychology (or even biology), it is
so far the branch with the greatest pretensions and the fewest reliable
results.
[Gazdar et al., 1985:5]
These are all fairly negative conclusions. Isn’t there anything positive to
conclude from this? Yes, there is.
I think that the reformulation of the issue between Searle and
Chomsky which I gave at the beginning deserves some consideration. I
think, in particular, that further explicitation of the purpose of linguistic
description will show that there are other interesting standards of
explanation than that set by Chomsky. To mention but one example, if
the purpose of your description is to reveal the referential properties of
language, then you are likely to need different categories and other
relationships than if your purpose of description is to make English
syntax understandable to second language learners. I am not hereby
saying that description or theory is unimportant. I am saying that you
have to think about what you need them for. This might even give some
substance to the much-discussed distinction between English and
English for special purposes, a distinction which, I’m afraid, I still find
somewhat elusive. And that, I think, is not a bad conclusion.
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